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In this dissertation I investigate whether managers alter the linguistic tone of their
eamings announcements to increase the value of their stock options. Empirical research
finds evidence that managers use optimistic tone to signal future firm performance.
However, prior literature also finds a positive relation between optimistic tone in eamings
announcements and shOli-window abnormal retums. The market reaction to optimistic
tone suggests that managers can profit from using pessimistic tone to lower the finn's
stock price prior to option grants and optimistic tone to increase the stock price prior to
option exercises.
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risk) are low and when the financial reporting incentives to do so (proxied by earnings
management) are high. I test these predictions using 17,2 I I finn-quarter observations
from 1998-2006. In my tests I regress the tone of the earnings announcement on its
known detenninants and indicators for a stock option grant or exercise shortly following
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managers increase optimistic tone prior to option exercises except when a high threat of
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financial gain is small relative to their total compensation.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Prior literature documents evidence that chief executive officers (CEOs) use their
financial reporting and disclosure choices around stock option grants and exercises to
influence stock prices and increase their wealth (e.g., Yermack 1997, Aboody and
Kasznik 2000, McAnally et al. 2008, Baker et al. 2008, Heron and Lie 2007, Narayanan
and Seyhun 2007). In addition to changing the timing of voluntary disclosure of
financial information or using accounting discretion to alter the reported earnings
number, prior literature suggests that CEOs can also influence stock prices by adjusting
the tone of their narrative disclosures (Davis et al. 2008, Demers and Vega 2008). In
this study, I investigate whether managers choose the language used in earnings press
releases (i.e., the linguistic tone) to increase their pay-off from stock options. In so
doing, my study examines whether managers adjust the language in the earnings
announcement to opportunistically increase their wealth. More broadly, this study
contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by providing evidence on how managers
trade-off opportunism and credibility with regard to voluntary disclosure.
One of the major challenges faced by empirical research in disclosure and
earnings management has been to directly link purported opportunistic behavior to
managers' wealth. Stock options provide a useful setting to test this link, since the gain
from exercising an option is equal to the difference between the value of the stock on the
2exercise date and the strike price, and firms almost always set the strike price equal to
the stock price on the date of the grant, or "at the money" (Matsunaga 1995, Yermack
1997, McAnally et al. 2008, Baker et al. 2008). Because the pay-off from options
increases when the stock price on the date of grant is lower and the stock price at the
date of exercise is higher, managers have an incentive to depress the stock price just
prior to option grants and inflate the stock price just prior to option exercises.
Prior literature documents that managers use several strategies to increase the
value of their stock options around the grant date. Yermack (1997) finds that
compensation committees issue options prior to the disclosure of good news about the
firm. Heron and Lie (2007) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2007) find evidence of
backdating during the 1990s, but also find backdating declined after the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of2002 (SOX). Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) find
negative abnormal stock returns before option grants and positive abnormal returns after
option grants, which is consistent with asymmetric timing of disclosure of good versus
bad news. Baker et al. (2003,2008), Balsam et al. (2003) and McAnally et al. (2008)
find evidence of downward earnings management prior to option grants.
There is evidence that managers use similar strategies to increase the firm's stock
price prior to option exercises. Bartov and Mohanram (2004), Cheng and Warfield
(2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find CEOs manage earnings upward prior
to option exercises. Cheng and Lo (2006) and Noe (1999) find insiders profit from
strategically trading around management forecasts. l However, while the prior literature
I Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that most executives immediately sell the shares acquired from exercising
options. Therefore option exercises are effectively insider sales.
3documents stock price movements around option grants and exercises consistent with
managers using voluntary disclosure to increase the profit from options, with the
exception of management forecasts, there is an absence of evidence regarding the
specific disclosure strategies managers use to influence stock prices.
One potential strategy available to managers is to alter the narrative tone in
earnings announcements to influence the manner in which the market interprets the
financial information provided in these announcements.2 For example, Davis et al.
(2008) and Demers and Vega (2008) find that the optimistic tone in earnings
announcements is associated with abnormal returns around the announcement date,
which indicates the market (at least partially) prices disclosure tone. Although the
results ofthese studies suggest that the narrative tone influences stock prices, it is not
clear whether managers use the tone to opportunistically increase their personal wealth.
Managers could use tone to disclose unbiased expectations of future performance.
Davis et al. (2008) find that the optimistic tone in earnings announcements
predicts future accounting returns, while Demers and Vega (2008) and Engelberg (2008)
find a relation between tone and long-run stock returns. These results suggest managers
use optimistic tone to credibly communicate private infoTInation about future
performance to market participants. Rogers et al. (2009) find the likelihood of
disclosure related class action lawsuits increases with the optimism of the earnings
announcement. This result suggests the threat of shareholder litigation encourages
credible narrative disclosure. Thus, these papers are consistent with managers, on
2 I use the terms earnings announcement and earnings press release interchangeably throughout the paper.
4average, using narrative tone to truthfully reveal expectations of future performance.
In this study, I investigate whether CEOs alter the optimistic tone of earnings
press releases around stock option grants and exercises to provide evidence on the
conflicting hypotheses of managerial opportunism and credible disclosure. If managers
adjust the tone in their earnings press releases to increase the gain from their options, I
expect a decrease in the optimistic tone in the press release prior to scheduled stock
option grants and an increase in the optimistic tone in the press release prior to stock
option exercises.
I also examine two settings in which managers are more likely to adjust their
tone prior to option transactions. First, the results in Rogers et al. (2009) suggest that
litigation risk restricts the use of optimistic tone. I partition my sample into firms with
high and low litigation risk, and hypothesize that the increase in optimistic tone prior to
stock option exercises is greater for firms facing low litigation risk than high litigation
risk. Second, prior literature finds evidence of earnings management prior to option
transactions. I hypothesize that the incentives to manage earnings are similar to the
incentives to adjust tone. In other words, executives manage earnings and alter tone in a
complementary manner to influence the stock price and thereby increase their payoffs
from stock options.
To assess the impact of adjusting tone on managers' wealth, I compute the
abnormal returns at the earnings announcement and estimate the coefficient from a
regression of abnormal returns on unexpected changes in optimistic tone. Then I
compute the abnormal return associated with a standard deviation change in unexpected
5tone. I use this abnormal return to estimate the increase in the value of CEOs' stock
options associated with altering tone prior to grants and exercises.
I conduct my tests using 17,211 firm-quarter observations from 1998-2006. On
average, I do not find evidence managers alter the tone of their earnings press releases
before stock option transactions. However, I find evidence of increased optimistic tone
prior to option exercises for firms in low litigation industries but not high litigation
industries, which suggests managers alter optimistic tone when expected litigation costs
are low. This evidence suggests the threat of litigation constrains the opportunistic use
of tone in earnings press releases. In addition, I find decreased optimistic tone prior to
option grants for firms with low discretionary accruals, which suggests that altering tone
is a complementary strategy to downward earnings management.
Prior literature documents a positive relation between optimistic tone and future
performance. I find that while this result holds on average, it does not hold for firm-
quarters prior to option grants and exercises. This result suggests that optimistic tone in
the press release does not predict future accounting performance when the press release
precedes an option transaction. One interpretation of this result is that managers alter
tone to increase the value of their stock options. However, since stock options create
incentives for increased managerial risk-taking and thus increased variance in future
performance, it is possible that option compensation makes it more difficult for
managers to accurately signal future performance.
Finally, I estimate changes in the value of CEOs' options associated with
changes in optimistic tone. Specifically, I compute the changes in option values
6associated with a standard deviation change in unexpected optimistic tone when
litigation risk is lower or executives manage earnings downward. Adjusting tone in
these settings increases the value ofCEOs' options by about $16,300 on average. This
evidence suggests that CEOs adjust tone to increase the value of their stock options even
when the financial gain from doing so is small relative to their total compensation.
However, the wealth transfer from shareholders to CEOs' as a result of altering tone is
not material.
My paper contributes to three streams of literature. First, I contribute to the
voluntary disclosure literature by examining whether managers use a specific disclosure
strategy to increase their personal wealth. I provide evidence that managers in low
litigation risk industries increase the value of their options at the time of exercise by
increasing optimistic tone in the press release. Second, I extend the earnings
management literature by documenting the extent to which adjusting accruals and
altering tone are strategic substitutes, complements, or unrelated. Prior studies on
earnings management and option compensation focus on earnings management in
isolation, without examining the interaction of multiple, perhaps simultaneous strategies
to increase compensation. My evidence suggests managers decrease the optimistic tone
in the press release to increase the value of their option at the time of the grant in
conjunction with downward earnings management.
Third, I increase our understanding of how managers trade-off opportunism and
credibility in setting the tone of their disclosures. My study provides specific evidence
on managers' cost-benefit analysis of stock option compensation and reputation in
7capital and labor markets, and how their analysis varies with litigation risk. Specifically,
I provide evidence that the threat of shareholder litigation constrains managerial
opportunism. I also find, perhaps surprisingly, that managers adjust tone
opportunistically even though the average gain from doing so is small. Thus my study
informs market participants and regulators who are interested in the credibility of
disclosures, particularly when managerial incentives encourage opportunism.
8CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Stock Option Compensation
The separation of ownership and control in public corporations creates agency
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Theoretically, stock option compensation helps
reduce agency costs by aligning the interests of senior managers and shareholders.
While Jensen and Murphy (1990) found low levels of pay for performance sensitivity for
CEOs in the 1980s, more recent studies such as Hall and Liebman (1998) suggest that
pay for performance sensitivity has increased in the past two decades. This increase
largely stems from the increase in stock option compensation, which has become the
single largest component of executive compensation (Baker et al. 2008, Bryan et al.
2000). While the prevailing consensus in the empirical literature supports the theory that
option compensation helps reduce agency costs (e.g., Core and Guay 1999, Bushman
and Smith 2001, Hanlon et al. 2003), evidence in Core et al. (2008) indicates stock
options can contribute to instances of excessive CEO compensation.
However, prior literature also finds that option compensation provides managers
with the opportunity to use disclosure policies to directly increase their wealth. Because
the value of a stock option is decreasing in the strike price and options are generally
granted at the money, managers can increase the value of their options by reducing the
stock price prior to an option grant. Prior literature has identified four strategies by
9which CEOs increase option compensation around the date of the option grant: timing
of disclosures, timing of the grant, backdating, and earnings management. Chauvin and
Shenoy (2001) find negative abnormal returns (which they interpret as disclosure of bad
news) prior to option grants. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) predict CEOs accelerate the
release of bad news before the grant and delay the release of good news until after the
grant. Using abnormal returns and changes in the distribution of analysts' forecasts as
proxies for disclosure, they find results consistent with their predictions. Aboodyand
Kasznik (2000) focus on grants made on a predicable schedule (i.e., 'scheduled' grants).
In contrast, Yerrnack (1997) examines a sample of option grants that are not
made on a predetermined schedule (i.e., 'unscheduled' grants) and finds that
compensation committees grant options prior to the disclosure of good news about the
firm. Yermack's (1997) findings suggest CEOs influence compensation committees to
adjust the option grant date. The wealth gain from a lower strike price also serves as the
motivation for the practice of backdating options. In this case, the firm adjusts the
recorded grant date ex-post so that the recorded date coincides with a local stock price
minimum. Backdating was most common in the late 1990s and was mitigated but not
eliminated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirement that insiders report stock option
grants to the SEC within two days of the grant (Lie 2005, Heron and Lie 2007,
Narayanan and Seyhun 2007).3
3 Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, insiders did not have to report grants on Form 4 (Changes in Beneficial
Ownership) until 10 days after the end of month of the grant and did not have to report grants on Form 5
(Annual Summary of Changes in Beneficial Ownership) until 45 days after the end of the fiscal year of the
grant. For technical reasons not all grants are required to be repOlted on Form 4.
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There is also evidence that CEOs alter their financial reporting choices to reduce
the stock price prior to option grants. Baker et al. (2008) find a negative relation
between discretionary accruals and the value of option grants that follow an earnings
announcement.4 Baker et al. (2008) argue that a negative unintended consequence of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is that in making backdating more costly it reduced the relative cost,
and thus increased the likelihood, of earnings management prior to option grants.
McAnally et al. (2008) find that executives manage earnings downward to intentionally
miss earnings targets prior to option grants in order to lower the strike price. In sum,
the evidence suggests that managers adjust their disclosures and accounting choices to
depress stock price prior to option grants.
Managers can also increase the value of their options by managing earnings
upward to increase the stock price just prior to option exercises. Bergstresser and
Philippon (2006) find a positive association between the number of options CEOs
exercise and abnormal accruals. Cheng and Warfield (2005) find managers sell more
stock after just meeting or beating analysts' forecasts. Bartov and Mohanram (2004)
find CEOs exercise options prior to declines in future earnings, and that the declines in
future earnings are in part attributable to the reversal of upward accruals management
prior to option exercise.
4 Consistent with prior literature in this area, I take earnings announcement timing as exogenous. Strictly
speaking this is not correct as Sengupta (2004) documents firm-specific determinants of earnings
announcement dates. However, Bagnoli et al. (2002) find most firms provide an expected earnings
announcement date, and usually announce on the expected day, indicating systematic adjustment of
earnings announcement dates is highly unlikely.
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Tone in Narrative Disclosures
In this dissertation, I extend the literature on potential opportunism around stock
option compensation by examining the linguistic tone in earnings announcements made
just prior to an option grant or exercise. Specifically, I examine the optimistic tone (or
sentiment) in earnings announcements. Davis et al. (2008) find optimistic tone in
earnings announcements has a positive relation with future accounting returns, and
Davis et al. (2008) and Demers and Vega (2008) find optimistic tone has a positive
relation with short-window abnormal returns around the earnings announcement. In
addition, Demers and Vega (2008) and Engelberg (2008) find a positive relation between
optimistic tone and long-run stock returns. Collectively, these results suggest optimistic
tone reveals managers' expectations of future performance. The short-term market
reaction indicates the market views optimistic tone as a credible indication of future
performance, although the association with long-run returns suggests the market reaction
at the earnings announcement is incomplete.
Narrative tone has been validated as credible communication in settings other
than earnings announcements. Tetlock (2007) finds pessimistic sentiment in a Wall
Street Journal column predicts market wide returns over the following week and Tetlock
et al. (2008) find pessimistic tone in news stories about S&P 500 firms predicts short-run
returns and future accounting earnings.5 Kothari et al. (2008) find measures of
pessimistic tone in financial news stories and analysts' reports relate to firm stock return
volatility and the dispersion of analysts' forecast errors. These results indicate market
5 Tetlock (2007) uses a measure of pessimistic words that is conceptually very similar to the optimistic
tone measure used in this paper. I write in terms of optimistic tone because I believe it makes my
hypotheses and tone measures more intuitive.
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participants view pessimistic (or optimistic-decreasing) tone as a credible signal of
future performance when originating from the popular press or financial analysts.
Several conflicting stories emerge regarding the use of optimistic tone around
stock option compensation. First, managers could alter the tone in the earnings
announcement before option grants or exercises to increase the value of their stock
options. Specifically, managers could decrease optimistic tone to lower the stock price
prior to an option grant in order to create a lower exercise price, and increase optimistic
tone prior to an option exercise to increase the stock price and generate a larger gain
upon exerCIse.
However, it is not obvious that managers will alter optimistic tone as a
mechanism to increase option compensation. A potential cost of altering tone is that
disclosures will not correspond to future firm performance. Over time, this could lead
market participants to discount the information provided in firms' disclosures. This
could also lead to an increased probability of class action litigation against the firm
(Rogers et al. 2009). Thus managers may use optimistic tone to truthfully convey their
expectations for future firm performance.
Theoretical and empirical research is consistent with the idea that managers use
their disclosures to credibly communicate information. Stocken (2000) presents an
analytical model in which a manager provides a costless signal of the value of an
investment opportunity, and later an audited report provides an ex-post assessment of the
value of the investment. Stocken (2000) demonstrates that in a repeated game, managers
almost always disclose truthfully. Hutton and Stocken (2007) find that managers can
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develop a reputation for providing accurate guidance, and the market responds more to
the guidance of high reputation managers.
While earnings management is often thought of as opportunistic, the flexibility in
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles also allows managers to adjust earnings to
communicate expectations of future performance. Givoly et al. (2008) find that analysts
impound the managed portion of earnings into forecasts and stock recommendations,
and that managed earnings are positively associated with future performance. They
argue that managers adjust earnings to signal future performance. Bartov et al. (2002)
find the relation between earnings that meet or beat analysts' forecasts and future
performance is similar for firms suspected and not suspected of earnings management.
This is consistent with earnings management truthfully signaling future performance.
With specific regard to optimistic tone, the credible communication story argues CEOs
adjust the optimistic tone in earnings announcements to reflect their expectations of
future performance, and stock option compensation does not alter this relation.
Hypotheses
To investigate the relation between optimistic tone and option compensation, I
test the following hypotheses, stated in the alternative form:
Hla: The optimistic tone in the earnings press release is lower when the CEO receives
an option grant in the quarter following the press release.
HI b: The optimistic tone in the earnings press release is greater when the CEO
exercises stock options in the quarter following the press release.
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While HI a and HI b address the average relation between optimistic tone and
stock option grants and exercises, the findings in Rogers et al. (2009) suggest that a
firm's use of optimistic tone is likely influenced by the litigation risk the firm faces.
Rogers et al. (2009) find the likelihood of a disclosure related shareholder lawsuit
increases with the optimistic tone of earnings press releases. Furthermore, plaintiffs tend
to cite the most optimistic portions of the press release as evidence the disclosures were
misleading. Disclosure related shareholder lawsuits reduce stock price (Rogers et al.
2009) and presumably damage managers' labor and capital market reputations. Since
overly optimistic language increases the likelihood of lawsuit, managers will not
increase optimistic tone ifthe increased expected litigation cost is greater than the
expected benefit from altering tone.
Assuming managers have unbiased expectations of litigation risk and the benefits
from altering linguistic tone, managers facing higher litigation risk are less likely to
increase optimistic tone in the earnings announcement. Shareholder litigation almost
always alleges managers were excessively optimistic. Therefore, I expect litigation risk
to mitigate optimistic tone around stock option exercises, since exercises provide a
motivation to be overly optimistic. My second hypothesis, stated in the alterative, is:
H2: Managers of firms in low litigation risk industries increase optimistic tone prior to
option exercises more than managers in high litigation risk industries.
Next, I examine how altering tone interacts, if at all, with adjusting reported
income, i.e., earnings management. Prior literature finds evidence that firms manage
15
earnings downward prior to stock options grants (Baker et al. 2008, McAnally et al.
2008) and upward prior to executive stock option exercises (Bartov and Mohanram
2004). I investigate the relation between optimistic tone and option grants and exercises
for firms most likely to have managed earnings. This analysis is important because it
examines whether altering linguistic tone is a separate phenomenon from earnings
management. It also provides evidence on whether earnings management and altering
tone are complements or substitutes.
Prior empirical literature (Baker et al. 2008, McAnally et al. 2008, Bartov and
Mohanram 2004) finds managers adjust reported earnings to increase stock option
compensation. The costs of doing so include missing analysts' earnings forecasts due to
downward earnings management (McAnally et al. 2008) or, given the reversing nature
of accruals, eventually missing analysts' forecasts after repeated upward earnings
management (Bartov and Mohanram 2004). Missing forecasts hurts managers' labor
and capital market reputations. Thus the cost-benefit analysis for earnings management
and altering tone is similar, and I expect the two mechanisms are used in similar
circumstances. In other words, I expect that earnings management and altering tone are
complements. I test the following hypotheses, stated in the alternative form:
H3a: Managers who adjust reported earnings downward prior to option grants also
decrease the optimistic tone of the earnings announcement prior to option grants.
H3b: Managers who adjust reported earnings upward prior to option exercises also
increase the optimistic tone of the earnings announcement prior to option exercises.
16
CHAPTER III
MEASURING TONE AND SAMPLE SELECTION
Measuring Tone
I measure optimistic tone using DICTION 5.0, an established text-analysis
software program (Hart 2000,2001). DICTION has been used in accounting research by
Davis et al. (2008), Demers and Vega (2008), and Rogers et al. (2009) and has been used
extensively to analyze discourse in related settings. 6 DICTION contains over 10,000
words categorized in 35 dictionaries (i.e., word lists) based on linguist theory (Hart
1984, 2000, 2001) and each dictionary contains several hundred words related to a
specific concept or idea (e.g., passivity, accomplishment, concreteness, liberation). A
dimension or attribute of language (e.g., optimistic tone) is represented by the words in
several dictionaries, and is measured by computing the percentage of words in a
document related to that dimension. DICTION measures optimistic tone as the
percentage of optimistic words less the percentage of pessimistic words in a document.
Consistent with prior literature (Rogers et al. 2009, Demers and Vega 2008) I measure
the optimistic tone in firms' earnings announcements and term this variable
OPTIMISM PRo Optimistic words are from dictionaries related to praise, satisfaction,
6 Examples include annual reports (Yuthas et al. 2002), general business communication (Ober et al.
2001), and speeches by Federal Reserve policymakers (Bligh and Hess 2005a, 2005b).
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and inspiration while pessimistic words are from dictionaries related to blame, hardship,
and denial. 7
DICTION has three primary strengths as a research tool. First, because it
performs text-analysis based on pre-set search rules and word dictionaries, DICTION is
free from researcher subjectivity and potential bias. Second, DICTION allows for
analysis of a large number of observations relative to manually reading documents and
coding language attributes. Finally, DICTION was designed to study political discourse,
which is similar to business communication (e.g., discussion of current events and plans
for the future). It has been validated in numerous studies of firms' disclosures. s
DICTION's primary weakness is its inability to account for context. For example,
DICTION would count a double negative as two pessimistic words. However, this is
unlikely to systematically bias the results of my study.
Sample Selection
I obtain data for the accounting variables from Compustat, returns data from the
Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP), analysts' forecasts and earnings surprise
data come from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), and CEO stock
option grant data from Execucomp. Specifically, Execucomp includes option expiration
dates, and I follow the standard methodology of inferring grant dates by assuming
options expire after whole-year increments with 10 years as the most common duration
(Aboody and Kasznik 2000, McAnally et al. 2008, Heron and Lie 2007). I hypothesize
7 See Appendix A for a more complete description and examples of specific words in each dictionary.
8 Prior literature has used DlCTlON to analyze earnings announcements (Davis et al. 2008, Demers and
Vega 2008, Rogers et al. 2009), annual reports (Yuthas et al. 2002) and the Management Discussion and
Analysis section of form 10-K (Ober et al. 1999).
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(Hla) CEOs alter the tone of earnings announcements to influence the strike price of
option grants. This implicitly assumes CEOs have prior knowledge of the option grant
date. Following prior literature (Aboody and Kasznik 2000, McAnally et al. 2008,
Heron and Lie 2007) I infer CEOs have prior knowledge of scheduled grants only, and
define scheduled grants as grants on the same month and day (plus or minus seven days)
as a grant in the prior calendar year. 9 I term this the traditional measure of scheduled
option grants.
I employ two methods to identify the date and number of shares of specific
option exercises. For exercises in 1998 through 2001 I manually search Investor's
Chronicle summary of insider transactions and record sales of common stock related to
option exercises. However, Investor's Chronicle ceased publication in late 2001. As a
result my 2002 data contains significant measurement error because I cannot identify
option exercise transactions, yet undoubtedly some occUlTed. Therefore I omit
observations for which the press release occurred in 2002. Since July 1, 2003 firms have
been required to provide insider transaction information to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) by filing Form 4 electronically via EDGAR. For this time period I
acquire stock option exercise information using 10K Wizard to access Form 4 data.
I use two sources of earnings press releases. The first set is from PR Newswire
and covers 1998-2003. 10 I match financial variables for the firm-quarter corresponding
9 Heron and Lie (2007) find evidence of backdating for unscheduled grants and backdated grants add
significant noise to my tests. Removing unscheduled grants provides a cleaner and more powerful test of
my hypotheses. Results for tests on the full sample of grants are presented as a robustness check.
10 I thank Angela Davis, Jeremy Piger and Lisa Sedor for graciously sharing this data with me.
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to the press release and retain observations containing all variables required for my tests.
The second set of earnings announcements is obtained from 10K Wizard and covers
2004-2006. 11 For this time period, I first identify all firm-quarters with the necessary
financial data for my tests. I retain all observations for which I can identify an earnings
press release. An 'event' firm-quarter is comprised of the financial variables for quarter
(t), the optimistic tone of the earnings press release related to quarter (t), and a stock
option grant or exercise between the press release and the end of quarter (1+1). A
'control' firm quarter is comprised of financial variables and a corresponding press
release for quarter (t), but without a stock option grant or exercise. Table 1, Panel A
outlines the sample selection procedure.
If a CEO exercises options several times between the press release and qUalter
end I consider the date of the exercise to be the date of the first exercise. I record the
number of shares acquired from exercise as the sum of the shares acquired from all
exercises during the quarter. Thus a CEO-fIrm-quarter appears in the sample only once.
Table 1, Panel B shows the observations by year, including the number of grant
and exercise observations per year. The number of observations increases substantially
from 2004 onward. I attribute this to the fact I have access to press releases from all
public firms, while the 1998-2003 data is based on press releases from PR Newswire.
II Regulation Fair Disclosure (2000) requires finns to file an 8-K with the SEC upon issuing a press
release. The press release is attached to the 8-K and thus is available on EDGAR and via 10K Wizard.
Table 1: Sample Selection
Panel A: Data Collection Process
1998-2003 sample of press releases from Davis et al. (2008)
Less observations missing financial variables
Less observations from 2002
1998-2003 sample
2004-2006 firm years with financial variables in CRSP,
Compustat, IBES and ExecuComp
Less observations missing press releases on 10K Wizard
2004-2006 sample
Sub-total
Less firm-quarters with both an option grant and option exercise
Total sample
Grant observations
Exercise observations
23,443
(14,680)
(1,941)
6,822
16,810
(6,211)
10,599
17,481
(270)
17,211
2,490
1,661
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Panel B: Firm-quarter Observations per Year
Grant Grant Grant
YEAR (Sched-T) (Sched-R) (All) Exercise Total
1998 27 16 64 9 272
1999 139 86 337 40 1,540
2000 116 79 309 50 1,487
2001 139 84 373 34 1,672
2003 156 90 333 84 1,832
2004 241 120 524 344 3,061
2005 231 7 519 490 3,678
2006 15 0 31 610 3,669
Total 1,064 482 2,490 1,661 17,211
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN
Research Design Overview
I test my hypotheses in four steps. In the first step I regress the optimistic tone in
the press release on its known determinants and indicator variables for the existence of
option grants and exercises. This test provides evidence on the average relation between
optimistic tone and option grants and exercise, and thus tests HI a and H1b. Second, I
partition the sample along litigation risk. I test H2 using these sub-samples to determine
if managers of firms facing low litigation risk increase optimistic tone prior to option
exercises more than managers of firms facing high litigation risk. Third, I investigate if
altering optimistic tone and managing earnings prior to option transactions are
complementary strategies, which provides evidence on H3a and H3b. Finally I measure
the relation between optimistic tone and short-window abnormal returns. This allows
me to quantify the economic impact of purported opportunistic use of tone.
Research Design for Hypothesis One
Earnings press releases are a listing requirement of the major stock exchanges in
the United States. Firms usually issue quarterly earnings announcements within a few
weeks of the quarter end. The National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) issued best
practice guidelines in 2001 for the content of earnings press releases. These guidelines
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specify that press releases include current period results under Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles and "should ordinarily include analyses of operating results and a
discussion of both positive and negative factors significantly affecting revenue,
profitability and other key financial indicators that measure the health of the enterprise
(e.g., debt to equity ratios, etc.)" (NIRI, 2001). In addition, NIRI guidelines recommend
discussing expected performance for upcoming quarters.
The guidelines suggested by NIRI form the basis of the empirical model of the
determinants of tone in the press release developed in Davis and Tama-Sweet (2009).
The model primarily consists of variables related to current period operating
performance. Given that anecdotal evidence suggests press releases often include fiscal
year-to-date results in addition to current quarter results, I include several measures of
prior performance. Finally, I include indicator variables for option grants and exercises.
I run the following pooled regression:
OPTIMISM_PRif = a + b/GRANTif + b2EXERCISEif + b3FUT_ROA if +
b40PTIMISJU_PRi(f_1) + bjLOGWCf + b6PCT_JMOBif + b7SD_ROA if + bsROA if +
b9LOSSif + b/oBEATif + bllSURPif + b12SI_DUMif + b13ABS_ACCRif + b/4LOGREVif +
b/jDAif + b/6BMif + Lib/7iQTRifi + Lib/S;YEARifi + LkbJ9kINDUSTR~fk + e (1)
OPTIMISJU_PR is computed as the percentage of words in the press release that
are optimistic less the percentage of words that are pessimistic. 12 GRANT and
12 For a complete description of all the variables see Appendix B.
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EXERCISE are indicator variables that equal one if the CEO either received a
(scheduled) option grant or exercised options between the earnings announcement and
the end of the quarter. 13,14 Hla predicts a negative coefficient on GRANT. A negative
coefficient implies that managers use less optimistic tone prior to option grants. HI b
predicts a positive coefficient on EXERCISE. A positive coefficient indicates that prior
to option exercises, managers use more optimistic tone in the press release. Given that
prior literature finds a positive relation between optimistic tone and short-window
returns, these predictions imply managers alter tone to influence stock prices and thereby
increase option compensation.
Variable Definitions
FUT_ROA is measured as the average return on assets over the four quarters
following quarter (t). LOGWC is the log of the number of words in the press release.
PCT_JMOB is the number of times in the prior four quarters the firm just met or beat the
median analyst forecast, expressed as a percent. The median forecast is from the final
set of analysts' forecasts before the earnings announcement. The median forecast and
actual earnings are from I/B/E/S. ROA is computed as income before extraordinary
items scaled by assets (IBQIATQ).'s SD ROA is the standard deviation of ROA over the
four quarters prior to quarter (t). LOSS is an indicator equal to one if income before
extraordinary items (IBQ) is less than zero. BEAT is an indicator equal to one if I/B/E/S
13 Suppose a firm has a calendar year end and the second qum1er ends on June 30. If the press release for
the second quarter is on July 31, for grants (exercises) that occur between August I and September 30,
GRANT (EXERCfSE) equals one.
14 Huddart et a1. (2007) find managers are most likely to trade after the earnings press release because legal
jeopardy is lower compared to right before the press release.
15 Unless otherwise specified, data names refer to the Compustat XPF quarterly database.
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actual earnings are greater than the I/B/E/S median analyst forecast. SURP is a
continuous variable computed as actual I/B/E/S earnings less the median I/B/E/S analyst
forecast, scaled by beginning of the quarter stock price (PRCCQt-l). SI DUM is an
indicator equal to one if any of the special item fields in Compustat (GDWILIPQ,
SETPQ, RCPQ, WDPQ, SPIOPQ) are non-zero, and zero otherwise. ABS ACCR is the
absolute value of accruals, computed as income before extraordinary items less cash
flow from operation, scaled by average assets ((IBQ - OANCFY)/((ATQ+ATQt_l)/2)).
LOGREV is the natural log of sales (SALEQ). DA is the total debt to assets ratio
(LTQIATQ). BA1 is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity
(CEQQ/(PRCCQ*CSHOQ)). QTR is a series of indicator variables for fiscal quarter,
YEAR is a series of indicator variables for calendar year, and INDUSTRY is a series of
indicator variables based on two-digit SIC code.
The explanatory variables in equation (l) represent determinants of optimistic
tone. A positive coefficient on FUT_ROA is consistent with managers using optimistic
tone to truthfully communicate their expectations for future performance.
OPTlA1ISA1_PR(f_J) is the optimistic tone in the prior quarter which helps capture
unobserved determinants of tone not otherwise captured in the model. LOGWC controls
for the length of the press release. Evidence suggests that firms have longer disclosures
when explaining poor operating results (Matsumoto et al. 2007). The next two variables
relate to the firm's prior performance. PCT_JA10B is included to capture the firm's
incentives to engage in earnings management (D'Souza et al. 2007). SD ROA controls
for uncertainty and seasonality in the operating environment.
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ROA, LOSS, BEAT and SURP are measures of current period income. SI DUM
and ABS_ACCR are included because special items or large accruals are usually
discussed in the press release (per NIRI guidelines) and thus could impact the optimistic
tone. LOGREV controls for systematic differences in optimistic tone related to firm size.
The next two variables, DA and BA1, are common 'financial indicators'. I include these
because NIRI guidelines suggest that firms discuss key financial indicators, and the
value of these variables could help explain the language used to describe them.
Research Design for Hypothesis Two
My tests of HI a and HI b provide evidence on the average relation between stock
option transactions and optimistic tone in the press release. H2 predicts that managers
facing low litigation risk increase optimistic tone prior to option exercises more than
managers facing high litigation risk. I partition my sample into firms with high
(HIGH~LITIGATION) and low (LOW_LITIGATION) litigation risk. Following Francis
et al. (1994), firms face high litigation risk if they belong to one of the following
industries (SIC codes in parentheses): pharmaceuticals/biotechnology (2833-2836,
8731-8734), computers (3570-3577, 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), and retail
(5200-5961). To test the impact oflitigation risk, I estimate equation (1) separately for
the HIGH_LITIGATION sample and the LOW_LITIGATION sample. Hypothesis H2
predicts the coefficient on EXERCISE for the LOW_LITIGATION sample is positive and
larger than the coefficient on EXERCISE for the HIGH_LITIGATION sample.
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Research Design for Hypothesis Three
H3 predicts that discretionary accruals and narrative tone are complementary
strategies to change stock price prior to stock option transactions. To provide evidence
on the relation between optimistic tone and option transactions in the presence of
earnings management, I extend equation (1) to include indicator variables for grants and
exercises that occur after a firm managed earnings downward or upward. I measure
earnings management using discretionary accruals based on the Jones (1991) model as
modified by Dechow et al. (1995). I implement the modified-Jones model using cross-
sectional industry-year-quarter regressions. I consider firm-quarters in the highest
quintile of discretionary accruals (HIGH_DACC) upward earnings management firm-
quarters and firm-quarters in the lowest quintile of discretionary accruals (LOW_DACC)
downward earnings management firm quarters. I run the following pooled regression:
OPTIMISM_PRiI = a + bIGRANT(LOW_DACC'JiI + b2GRANTiI +
b3EXERCISE(HIGH_DACCh + b4EXERCISEiI + bsLOW_DACCiI + b6HIGH_DACC, +
b7FUT_ROA iI + bsOPTIMISM_PR iI, _lJ + b9LOGWCiI + bIOPCT_JMOBiI +
bJISD_ROA iI + bJ2ROA iI + bJ3LOSSiI + b14BEATi, + blSSURPiI + bI6SI_DUMiI +
b17ABS_ACCRi, + blSLOGREViI + bl9DA il + b20BMiI + 2jb2ljQTRilf + 2 jb22jYEAR"i +
(2)
Equation (2) extends equation (1) by including indicators for grants after a firm
managed earnings downward (GRANT(LOW DACC), for exercises after a firm
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managed earnings upward (EXERCISE(HIGH DACC)), and for high (HIGH DACC)
- -
and low (LOW_DACC) discretionary accruals. H3a predicts that when managers reduce
reported earnings before option grants they also reduce optimistic tone in the press
release. Thus H3a predicts the sum of the coefficients on GRANT and
GRANT(LOW DACC) is negative. Similarly, H3b predicts the sum of the coefficients
on EXERCISE and EXERCISE(HIGH_DACC) is positive. To provide evidence on these
hypotheses, I conduct an F-test to determine if the sum of the coefficients is different
from zero.
Measuring Changes in the Value of CEOs' Stock Options
The prior tests provide evidence regarding the extent to which managers adjust
the optimistic tone in earnings announcements prior to option transactions. I next
examine the magnitude of the market reaction to changes in optimistic tone. While a
positive relation between optimistic tone and short-window abnormal returns is
established in prior literature, I estimate this relation for my sample and use the estimate
to compute compensation gains related to changes in tone. This estimation is necessary
to link potentially opportunistic behavior to increases in CEO wealth. Since market
participants have an expectation of the optimistic tone in the press release, I investigate
the market reaction to unexpected optimistic tone instead of the level of optimistic tone.
I measure unexpected optimistic tone as the residual from a determinants model of tone
developed by Davis et al. (2008) and Davis and Tama-Sweet (2009):
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(3)
The determinants model is the same as equation (1) except for the exclusion of
GRANT and EXERCISE. The residual from the determinants model is the unexpected
optimistic tone (UNEXP OPT).16 I regress abnormal returns around the earnings
announcement against UNEXP_OPT to estimate the magnitude of the price reaction to
the optimistic tone in the earnings announcement. I use a model developed by Davis et
al. (2008):
(4)
CAR_PR is the cumulative abnormal return for the three days centered on the
earnings press release. Each daily return is adjusted by the return of a matched size and
book to market portfolio. I7 A non-zero coefficient on UNEXP_OPT is consistent with
the market reacting to the unexpected optimistic tone in the earnings announcement. A
positive coefficient is consistent with managers truthfully communicating expectations
16 In sensitivity tests, I examine an alternate measure of unexpected optimistic tone.
17 I create 25 size and book to market portfolios based on the methodology, breakpoints and return data
from Ken French's website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/dataJibrary).
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for future performance and is consistent with prior literature (Davis et al. 2008, Demers
and Vega 2008).
The coefficient on UNEXP_OPT in equation (4) indicates the average relation
between unexpected optimistic tone and short-window returns across all firm-quarters. I
also estimate equation (4) for sub-samples related to my hypotheses: low litigation risk
firms and firm-quarter in the extreme quintiles of discretionary accruals. For each sub-
sample the coefficient on UNEXP_OPT provides an upper bound for the abnormal
return, and therefore the increase in managerial wealth, associated with a change in
optimistic tone prior to an option grant or exercise.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for my dataset. All continuous variables
have been winsorized at the 1% level to control for outliers. The mean OPTIMISM PR
is 0.769, indicating that on average press releases are more optimistic than pessimistic.
Evidence suggests the firms in my sample are profitable. The mean ROA and mean
FUT_ROA are 1.5% and 1.4%. Approximately 12% of firm-quarters report a loss
(LOSS=l), and firms meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations about 75% of the time
(BEAT=l). Finally, I find scheduled option grants in 6.2% of firm-quarters
(GRANT(SCHED-T)=l) and option exercises in 9.7% of firm-quarters (EXERCISE=l).
A correlation matrix, presented in Table 3, provides initial evidence on
the relation between pessimistic tone, option transactions and future performance.
Optimistic tone positively correlates with current and future return on assets. However,
the correlation between optimistic tone and option exercises is not significant and there
is a significantly positive correlation between optimistic tone and stock option grants.
The coefficient is only 0.029, yet this result is statistically significant in the opposite
direction of my prediction in H1a.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max
OPTIMISM PR 0.769 0.690 0.683 -0.600 2.990
UNEXP OPT 0.000 -0.025 0.443 -2.288 2.863
EXERCISE 0.097 0.000 0.000 1.000
GRANT (SCHED-T) 0.062 0.000 0.000 1.000
GRANT (SCHED-R) 0.028 0.000 0.000 1.000
GRANT (ALL) 0.145 0.000 0.000 1.000
FUT ROA 0.014 0.013 0.019 -0.063 0.070
LOGWC 7.472 7.457 0.583 5.964 9.065
PCT JMOB 0.490 0.500 0.332 0.000 1.000
SD ROA 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.000 0.088
ROA 0.015 0.013 0.021 -0.071 0.081
LOSS 0.121 0.000 0.327 0.000 1.000
BEAT 0.745 1.000 0.436 0.000 1.000
SURP 0.014 0.010 0.077 -0.310 0.315
SI DUM 0.280 0.000 0.000 1.000
ABS ACCR 0.045 0.024 0.054 0.000 0.266
LOGREV 5.991 5.885 1.498 2.748 9.794
DA 0.529 0.536 0.215 0.083 0.948
MB 3.287 2.377 2.972 0.569 19.268
HI LIT 0.297 0.000 0.000 1.000
DACe 0.000 -0.001 0.033 -0.102 0.116
CAR PR 0.005 0.002 0.076 -0.512 0.606
For complete variable dellnitions see Appendix B. The reported statistics are based on 17.211 observations
for all variables except DACe. for which the statistics are based on 13.461 observations.
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Table 3: Correlations
OPT ROA FUT GRANT GRANT EXER- 1-11 LIT
-
PR ROA (SCHED-T) (ALL) CISE
OPTIMISM PR 1.000
ROA 0.119 1.000
0.000
FUT ROA 0.114 0.684 1.000
0.000 0.000
GRANT (SCHED-T) 0.029 -0.004 0.010 1.000
0.000 0.598 0.203
GRANT (ALL) 0.022 -0.029 -0.03 I 0.624 1.000
0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
EXERCISE 0.005 0.101 0.111 -0.084 -0.134 1.000
0.493 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
HI LIT -0.070 0.029 0.005 -0.028 0.023 0.024 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.537 0.000 0.002 0.002
DACC -0.006 0.064 0.020 -0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005
0.472 0.000 0.020 0.494 0.495 0.608 0.535
Correlation coefficients are listed on the fIrst line: p-values are listed on second line. For complete variable
defInitions see Appendix B.
Before beginning my tests, I replicate the results of Davis et al. (2008) to ensure
the relation between future return on assets and optimistic tone holds for my sample.
The results are presented in Table 4. The coefficient on OPTIMISM_PR is positive and
significant, and of similar magnitude to the results in Davis et al. (2008).
Table 4: Optimistic Tone and Future Return on Assets
Replication of Davis et al. (2008)
(1)
FUT ROA
ROA 0.442***
(0.000)
SD ROA -0.078***
(0.000)
LOGREV 0.001 ***
(0.000)
SURP -0.002
(0.331 )
BEAT 0.002***
(0.000)
LOSS -0.000
(0.799)
PM 0.005*
(0.075)
AT 0.009***
(0.000)
LEV -0.013***
(0.000)
MB 0.001 ***
(0.000)
OPTIMISM PR 0.001 ***
(0.000)
YEAR/INDUSTRY Included
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CONSTANT
OBSERVATIONS
ADJUSTED R2
0.009
(0.152)
17,211
0.533
Robust p-values in parentheses. based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **. *** indicate significance
at ] 0%. 5% and 1% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
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Tests of Hypotheses
The results of my first multivariate test are presented in Table 5, Panel A. The
two columns present results using different definitions of option grants. In column (I),
GRANT includes scheduled grants measured as in prior literature as grants on the same
month and day (plus or minus seven days) as a grant in the prior calendar year (i.e., the
traditional definition).
In column (2), GRANT includes scheduled grants measured as grants on the same
month and day (plus or minus seven days) as a grant in the prior and following calendar
year. This more restrictive definition reduces the number of grants classified as
scheduled, but increases the likelihood the CEO knows the grant is forthcoming.
Hla predicts a negative coefficient on GRANT However, I find the coefficient
(p-value) on GRANT is 0.004 (0.726) for the traditional definition of scheduled grants
and -0.027 (0.220) for the restrictive definition of scheduled grants. This evidence does
not support the prediction in HI a that managers reduce optimistic tone prior to option
grants. The coefficients on EXERCISE are also insignificant with coefficients (p-values)
of 0.005 (0.675) and 0.004 (0.726).18 This evidence does not support the prediction in
HI b that managers increase optimistic tone prior to option exercises. Consistent with
prior literature, I find a coefficient (p-value) on FUT_ROA of about 0.96 (0.000) in each
of the two specifications, which indicates that optimistic tone can be used to predict
future accounting returns. The evidence in Panel A of Table 5 suggests that, on average,
18 It is not surprising that the coefficient on EXERCISE does not change much based on the definition of
GRANT.
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managers use optimistic tone to credibly signal future accounting performance and do
not adjust optimistic tone in the press release to increase option compensation.
To further investigate the relation between future performance and optimistic
tone, I partition the sample into two groups based on whether or not the press release
occurs before a grant or exercise. If managers use tone to credibly signal future
performance, I expect a positive relation between optimistic tone and future performance
for both samples of press releases. An insignificant relation between tone and future
performance for press releases that precede option transactions would suggest managers
do not use tone to signal future performance prior to option activity. I estimate equation
(3) for the full sample and the two sub-samples and present the results in Table 5, Panel
B. For the full sample, the coefficient (p-value) on FUT_ROA is 0.959 (0.000).
However, for quarters in which the press release preceded an option transaction the
coefficient (p-value) on FUT_ROA is 0.358 (0.572) while the coefficient (p-value) on
FUT_ROA is 1.07 (0.000) for quarters in which the press release did not precede an
option transaction.
While the evidence in Panel A suggests that managers do not adjust their tone
prior to an option grant or exercise, the results in Panel B suggest an insignificant
relation between the tone and future performance when the press release is followed by
an option transaction. One potential explanation for these results is that option
transactions occur when firms operate in highly uncertain environments, and as a result
optimistic tone in the earnings release becomes a noisy signal of future performance.
Table 5: Tests of the Relation between Optimistic Tone and
Stock Option Transactions
Panel A
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GRANT (SCHED-T)
GRANT (SCHED-R)
EXERCISE
FUT ROA
LAG OPTIMSIM
LOGWC
PCT JMOB
SD ROA
ROA
LOSS
BEAT
SURP
SI DUM
ABS ACCR
LOGREV
DA
MB
QTRJYRJIND
CONSTANT
OBSERVATIONS
ADJUSTED R2
(1) (2)
Prediction OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR
0.004
(0.762)
-0.027
(0.220)
+ 0.005 0.004
(0.675) (0.726)
0.954*** 0.964***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.699*** 0.699***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.038*** 0.039***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.036*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.002)
-0.314 -0.319
(0.233) (0.225)
0.234 0.226
(0.391) (0.406)
-0.048*** -0.048***
(0.001) (0.001)
0.038*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.239*** 0.238***
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.024*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.005)
-0.151* -0.151*
(0.098) (0.097)
0.006* 0.006*
(0.09 I) (0.084)
0.090*** 0.090***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.001 0.001
(0.566) (0.557)
Included Included
-0.194** -0.193**
(0.020) (0.020)
17,2 I 1 17,211
0.577 0.577
Robust p-values in parentheses, based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **, *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5% and I% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
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Table 5 (continued)
Panel B Full sample Grant/ exercise qtrs Non-option quarters
(1) (2) (3)
OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR
FUT ROA 0.959*** 0.358 1.070***
(0.000) (0.572) (0.000)
LAG OPTIMSIM 0.699*** 0.741*** 0.689***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOGWC 0.038*** 0.010 0.046***
(0.000) (0.629) (0.000)
PCT JMOB 0.036*** 0.074** 0.029**
(0.002) (0.011) (0.019)
SO ROA -0.316 0.438 -0.439
(0.229) (0.533) (0.123)
ROA 0.234 1.322* 0.090
(0.391) (0.074) (0.759)
LOSS -0.048*** -0.013 -0.053***
(0.001) (0.741) (0.000)
BEAT 0.038*** 0.041 0.037***
(0.000) (0.123) (0.001)
SURP 0.239*** 0.295** 0.228***
(0.000) (0.022) (0.000)
SI DUM -0.024*** -0.035* -0.022**
(0.005) (0.097) (0.019)
ABS ACCR -0.150* 0.163 -0.201 **
(0.099) (0.513) (0.040)
LOGREV 0.006* 0.010 0.005
(0.086) (0.240) (0.204)
DA 0.089*** 0.153** 0.075***
(0.000) (0.018) (0.004)
MB 0.001 -0.006* 0.002
(0.553) (0.081) (0.179)
QTRlYRIIND Included Included Included
CONSTANT -0.195** 0.039 -0.218**
(0.019) (0.827) (0.015)
OBSERvATIONS 17,211 2,725 14,486
ADJUSTED R" 0.577 0.630 0.566
Robust p-values in parentheses. based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **. *** indicate significance at
10%. 5% and I% levels based all two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
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Next I investigate the settings in which managers are more likely to alter their
use of optimistic language. H2 predicts a positive coefficient on EXERCISE for
LOW LITIGATION firms and that the coefficient on EXERCISE for the
LOW_LITIGATION sample is larger than the coefficient on EXERCISE for the
HIGH_LITIGATION sample. Table 6, Panel A presents the results for
LOW_LITIGATION firms and Panel B presents results for HIGH_LITIGATION firms. I
discuss the results using the traditional definition of scheduled grants. The results using
the more rigid definition of scheduled grants are very similar.
In Panel A, column (1) the coefficient of 0.031 on EXERCISE is significant for
low litigation firms, with a p-value of 0.026. This is consistent with managers increasing
the optimistic tone prior to stock option exercises when litigation risk is low and
supports H2. For HIGH LITIGATION firms the results in Panel B, column (1) show the
coefficient (p-value) on EXERCISE is -0.041 (0.035). This evidence indicates managers
reduce optimistic tone prior to option exercises when litigation risk is higher. Consistent
with H2, the coefficient on EXERCISE is larger for the LOW_LITIGATION sample than
the HIGH LITIGATION sample. One interpretation of this result is that high litigation
risk leads managers to be excessively pessimistic in press releases prior to option
exercises. This is consistent with the findings in Rogers et al. (2009) that almost all
disclosure related lawsuits claim that managers were overly optimistic, and therefore
managers have an incentive to be less optimistic to reduce the likelihood of litigation,
especially prior to insider sales. These results imply the threat of litigation constrains the
opportunistic use of tone in the press releases.
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Table 6: Optimistic Tone and Stock Option Transactions:
The Impact of Litigation Risk
Panel A: LOW LITIGATION firms
(1) (2)
Prediction OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR
GRANT (SCHED-T) 0.006
(0.7]2)
GRANT (SCHED-R) -0.035
(0.176)
EXERCISE + 0.03] ** 0.030**
(0.026) (0.031)
FUT ROA 1.031*** 1.042***
(0.005) (0.005)
LAG OPTIMSIM 0.695*** 0.695***
(0.000) (0.000)
LOGWC 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.000) (0.000)
PCT JMOB 0.055*** 0.056***
(0.000) (0.000)
SD ROA 0.309 0.299
(0.440) (0.456)
ROA -0.298 -0.307
(0.434) (0.419)
LOSS -0.076*** -0.076***
(0.000) (0.000)
BEAT 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.002)
SURP 0.228*** 0.228***
(0.000) (0.000)
SI DUM -0.026** -0.026**
(0.013) (0.0] 3)
ABS ACCR -0.225* -0.226*
(0.059) (0.059)
LOGREV 0.008* 0.008**
(0.053) (0.047)
DA -0.007 -0.007
(0.842) (0.838)
MB 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.007) (0.006)
QTRlYRlIND Included Included
CONSTANT -0.307*** -0.306***
(0.001) (0.00])
OBSERVATIONS ]2,09] ]2,091
ADJUSTED R2 0.579 0.579
Robust p-values in parentheses, based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **. *** indicate significance
at 10%,5% and I% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
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Table 6 (continued)
Panel B: HIGH LITIGATION firms
(1) (2)
Prediction OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR
GRANT (SCHED-T) 0.001
(0.959)
GRANT (SCHED-R) 0.004
(0.929)
EXERCISE + -0.041 ** -0.041 **
(0.035) (0.034)
FUT ROA 0.714** 0.713**
(0.035) (0.036)
LAG OPTIMSIM 0.691 *** 0.691 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
LOGWC 0.015 0.015
(00411) (0.411 )
PCT JMOB 0.009 0.009
(0.661) (0.661 )
SO ROA -0.873** -0.873 **
(0.013) (0.013)
ROA 0.935** 0.935**
(0.019) (0.018)
LOSS -0.004 -0.004
(0.881 ) (0.882)
BEAT 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.005) (0.005)
SURP 0.262* 0.262*
(0.055) (0.055)
SI DUM -0.022 -0.022
(0.125) (0.125)
ABS ACCR 0.007 0.007
(0.959) (0.958)
LOGREV 0.005 0.005
(0.312) (0.312)
DA 0.189*** 0.189***
(0.000) (0.000)
MB -0.004** -0.004**
(0.038) (0.038)
QTRlYRIIND Included Included
CONSTANT 0.261* 0.261 *
(0.060) (0.060)
OBSERVATIONS 5,120 5,120
ADJUSTED R2 0.569 0.569
Robust p-values in parentheses. based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **. *** indicate significance
at 10%.5% and I% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
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1 next discuss the tests of H3, which predicts that managers who reduce reported
earnings prior to option grants and increase reported earnings prior to option exercises
also adjust optimistic tone in the same direction. Specifically, H3a predicts that the sum
of the coefficients on GRANT(LOW_DACC) and GRANT is negative and H3b predicts
the sum of the coefficients on EXERCISE(HIGH_DACC) and EXERICSE is positive.
Table 7, column (1) presents results for the traditional definition of scheduled
option grants. The results ofF-tests for the sum of the coefficients are not significant for
either grants or exercises. This evidence does not support H3a or H3b. Column (2)
presents results for the restricted definition of scheduled option grants. The sum of the
coefficients on GRANT(LOW_DACC) and GRANT is -0.096 with a p-value from the F-
test of 0.066. This indicates that when managers record low discretionary accruals prior
to an option grant, they also reduce the optimistic tone in the press release. The F-test of
the sum of the exercise coefficients is insignificant. This evidence suggests that when
managers are most likely to know of forthcoming option grants (i.e., the restricted
definition of scheduled grants) and they manage earnings downward, they also use less
optimistic tone in the press release. 1t provides some support for H3a and indicates
managing earnings downward and reducing optimistic tone are complementary strategies
to lower stock price.
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Table 7: Optimistic Tone and Stock Option Transactions:
The Impact of Discretionary Accruals
Discretionary accruals
GRANT(LOW_DACC)
(SCHED-T)
GRANT (SCHED-T)
GRANT(LOW_DACC)
(SCHED-R)
GRANT
EXER (HIGH_DACC)
EXERERCISE
LOW DACC
HIGH DACC
FUT ROA
CONTROLS
QTRlYRlfND
CONSTANT
OBSERVATIONS
ADJUSTED R2
(I) (2)
Prediction OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR
0.006
(0.899)
0.003
(0.821 )
-0.079
(0.166)
-0.017
(00490)
-0.036 -0.035
(0.263 ) (0.271)
0.011 0.010
(0.373) (00410)
0.011 0.013
(0.290) (0.204)
-0.018* -0.018*
(0.094) (0.088)
0.943*** 0.953***
(0.000) (0.000)
Included Included
Included Included
-0.194** -0.191 **
(0.019) (0.022)
17,211 17,211
0.577 0.577
GRANT
F-TESTS:
Sum of coefficients
0.009
(0.829)
GRANT ~.O%
(0.066)*
EXERCISE + -0.025 -0.025
(00405) (00400)
Robust p-values in parentheses. based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **. *** indicate significance at
10%.5% and I% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B. Additional control
variables are included in the estimation but omitted from the table for the sake of brevity.
43
Estimating CEOs' Financial Gain
Finally, I estimate the gains to a manager from adjusting the tone of the earnings
announcements prior to option grants and exercises. First, I document the average
relation between optimistic tone and short-window abnormal returns. Following
equation (4), I regress three-day abnormal returns against unexpected optimistic tone and
a series of control variables that prior literature finds relate to returns around the
earnings announcement. My findings are presented in Table 8, column (1). Consistent
with prior literature, the coefficient (p-value) on UNEXP_OPT is 0.004 (0.001).
Table 8: Tests of the Relation between Optimistic Tone and
Short-widow Abnormal Returns
Full Sample Low litigation Low DACC
(1) (2) (3)
Prediction CAR PR CAR PR CAR PR
llNEXP OPT + 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.006*
(0.004) (0.009) (0.087)
SURP 0.146*** 0.125*** 0.174***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BEAT 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOSS -0.006** -0.004 -0.004
(0.008) (0.113) (0.479)
QTR, YEAR AND Included Included Included
INDUSTRY
CONSTANT -0.001 -0.008 0.018
(0.946) (0.646) (0.409)
OBSERVATIONS 17,211 12,091 2,692
ADJUSTED R2 0.067 0.078 0.072
Robust p-values in parentheses, based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **. *** indicate significance
at 10%,5% and 1% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete variable de1initions see Appendix B.
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Table 8, column (2) repeats the test presented in column (1) but limits the sample
to LOW_LITIGATION firms. I impose this limitation because the LOW_LITIGATION
sample provides evidence of increased optimistic tone prior to option exercises. The
results are similar to the full sample, with a coefficient (p-value) on UNEXP_OPT of
0.003 (0.001). This evidence suggests a change in optimistic tone is a mechanism by
which managers could influence short-run returns and increase compensation.
A coefficient on UNEXP_OPT of 0.003 implies that a one-unit change in
UNEXP_OPT corresponds to a 30 basis point increase in the three-day abnorn1al return
around the earnings announcement. The standard deviation of UNEXP_OPT is 0.443, so
a standard deviation change in UNEXP_OPT implies a 13 basis point increase in the
abnormal return. While not large in absolute value, this is relatively large compared to
the mean (median) abnormal return around the press release of 50 (20) basis points. For
the firm-quarters in which options are exercised, the mean value of the exercise is $5.07
million. A 13 basis point change in the stock price implies a mean gain at the time of the
option exercise of about $6,600.
I perform a similar analysis for LOW_DACC firms since the evidence in Table 7
indicates managers decrease optimistic tone prior to option grants when they also record
low discretionary accruals. The regression results, presented in column (3), show a
coefficient (p-value) on UNEXP_OPT of 0.006 (0.077). A one standard deviation
change in UNEXP_OPT implies a 27 basis point increase in the abnormal return. For
the firm-quarters in which option grants are made, the mean value of the grant is $3.59
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million. A 27 basis point change in the stock price implies an increase in grant value of
about $9,700.
Overall, I interpret my results to indicate that, on average, managers do not alter
the tone of their earnings announcements prior to stock option grants or exercises.
However, in predictable subsets of my sample managers do appear to use tone
opportunistically. Specifically, managers increase the optimistic tone in the earnings
announcement prior to option exercises, conditional upon litigation risk being low. In
addition, managers tend to reduce optimistic tone prior to option grants in conjunction
with downward earnings management. The average increase in compensation related to
these strategies is small compared to the total value of CEOs' compensation packages.
The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 made several significant changes to the
governance and reporting requirements of publicly traded firms. I conduct an
exploratory analysis to determine if SOX-mandated changes to financial reporting
impact the use of tone around stock option transaction. Heron and Lie (2007) find SOX
significantly reduced the frequency of stock option backdating by requiring firms to
report stock option grants to the SEC within two days of the grant date. If, prior to SOX,
some of the scheduled grants were backdated, there would be noise in my tests because a
press release written prior to the "grant date" of a backdated grant would be written
without the expectation a grant was forthcoming. In addition, Baker et al. (2008) argue
that since SOX substantially increased the cost of backdating, it encouraged alternate
methods of increasing option compensation. Thus the elimination of option backdating
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could result in more managers using optimistic tone to increase the payoff from their
stock options. Given the potential reduction in noise and the decreased relative cost of
altering optimistic tone after SOX, I expect tests of hypotheses HI a and HI b to result in
larger coefficients after SOX than before SOX.
SOX also increased the overall scrutiny placed on financial reporting. For
example, Section 302 requires CEOs and CFOs to certify financial statement accuracy.
This potentially creates an environment in which managers revise their expected
litigation risk upward. Thus, after SOX, even firms facing relatively low litigation risk
might experience an increased absolute level of litigation risk, thereby reducing the
likelihood of altering optimistic tone. However, given the increased scrutiny of financial
reporting, I expect stronger support for H2 after SOX since managers of low litigation
risk firms view altering tone as a less risky method to influence stock price.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a less clear implication for the relation between tone
and option transactions in the presence of earnings management. The results of Baker et
al. (2008) suggest managers are more likely to manage earnings and alter tone after SOX
than before SOX. However, the increased scrutiny of financial reporting after SOX
suggests the absolute costs of earnings management and altering tone increase after
SOX, thereby reducing these activities. Thus I make no prediction for the relative
strength of hypotheses H3a and H3b before SOX versus after SOX.
The results of the tests of H1a and HI b for periods before and after the passage
of SOX are presented in Table 9 below.
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Table 9: Optimistic Tone and Stock Option Transactions: The Impact of SOX
Pre-SOX Pre-SOX Post-SOX Post-SOX
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predict OPTIMISM OPTIMISM OPTIMISM OPTIMISM
PR PR PR PR
GRANT -0.017 0.0] 8
(SCHED-T) (0.484) (0.304)
GRANT -0.04 ] -0.013
(SCHED-R) (0.] 95) (0.682)
EXERCISE + 0.023 0.022 0.00] 0.000
(0.615) (0.625) (0.913) (0.994)
FUT ROA 0.942** 0.954** 0.942*** 0.943***
(0.033) (0.03]) (0.002) (0.002)
LAG 0.650*** 0.650*** 0.7]0*** 0.7]0***
-
OPTIMSIM
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOGWC 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.037*** 0.038***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
PCT JMOB 0.038 0.039 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.] 08) (0.] 03) (0.008) (0.007)
SO ROA 0.969* 0.964* -0.9]] *** -0.9]4***
(0.085) (0.087) (0.002) (0.002)
ROA 0.725 0.720 0.038 0.035
(0.] 56) (0.] 59) (0.907) (0.9] 4)
LOSS -0.047* -0.048* -0.050*** -0.050***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.002) (0.002)
BEAT 0.05]*** 0.05] *** 0.03] *** 0.032***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
SURP 0.424*** 0.426*** 0.] 92*** 0.]9]***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
SI DUM -0.008 -0.009 -0.030* ** -0.030***
(0.732) (0.725) (0.00] ) (0.00] )
ABS ACCR -0.332* -0.335* -0.028 -0.026
(0.053) (0.05]) (0.79] ) (0.806)
LOGREV 0.005 0.005 0.007* 0.008**
(0.496) (0.473) (0.052) (0.046)
DA 0.092** 0.09] ** 0.099*** 0.099***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.00] ) (0.001)
MB -0.00] -0.001 0.001 0.00]
(0.798) (0.806) (0.623) (0.616)
QTRJYRJ]ND Included Included Included Included
CONSTANT -0.298 -0.298 -0.286*** -0.286***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.002) (0.002)
OBS 4,971 4,97] 12,240 ]2,240
ADJ R2 0.535 0.535 0.591 0.591
Robust p-values in parentheses, based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **. *** indicate significance at
]0%,5% and ]% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
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The results in Table 9 are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 5 for
the entire sample period. I do not find evidence of option grants or exercises being
associated with optimistic tone in the press release.
Next, I examine if the results for LOW_LITIGATION and HIGH_LITIGATION
firms vary before and after Sarbanes-Oxley. Table 10, Panel A presents the results for
LOW_LITIGATION firms before and after SOX. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, none of the
coefficients on GRANT or EXERCISE are significant at conventional levels. However,
after Sarbanes-Oxley the coefficient (p-value) on EXERCISE is 0.027 (0.058) in the
traditional scheduled grant specification and 0.026 (0.074) in the restricted scheduled
grant specification. These results are very similar to those presented in Table 6 for the
entire sample period, which suggests the prior findings are restricted to the post-SOX
time period. Specifically, it implies that managers increase optimistic tone prior to
option exercises after SOX, but not before SOx. This evidence is consistent with the
argument of Baker et al. (2008) that SOX reduced backdating and thus made other forms
of opportunism relatively less costly. However, an alternative explanation is that my
variables are measured with less noise after SOX. 19
Panel B of Table 10 presents the results for HIGH_LITIGATION firms. For both
definitions, the coefficient on GRANT is insignificant both before and after Sarbanes-
Oxley. The coefficient on EXERCISE is similar across both specifications. I discuss the
results from the specification that includes the traditional definition of scheduled grants.
19 For example, it is possible that my definition oflow and high litigation firms is more accurate after SOX
than before SOX. In addition, the coefficients prior to SOX are almost four times larger than those after
SOX. Given the sample size is several times larger after SOX, the lack statistical significance prior to
SOX could be due to a lack of statistical power.
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Prior to SOX, the coefficient (p-value) on EXERCISE is -0.021 (0.728), while after SOX
the coefficient (p-value) on EXERCISE is -0.048 (0.021). This evidence suggests that
while managers of HIGH_LITlGA TlON firms did not alter their tone before stock option
exercises prior to the passage of SOX, they reduced their optimistic tone prior to stock
option exercises after the passage of SOX. This is consistent with SOX leading to an
increase in the scrutiny of financial disclosures, particularly for firms with high litigation
risk. Overall, the results from Table 10 are consistent with my expectation that the
impact of litigation risk is more prevalent after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed.
Next, I investigate if the complementary relation between lowering discretionary
accruals and reducing optimistic tone varies before and after Sarbanes-Oxley. The
results are presented in Table 11. I find evidence of a complementary strategy of
downward earnings management and reducing optimistic tone before option grants prior
to Sarbanes-Oxley. An F-test of the sum ofGRANT(LOW_DACC) and GRANT is
negative and significant before SOX but not after SOX. Specifically, prior to SOX the
sum of the coefficients (p-value from F-test) on GRANT(LOW DACC) and GRANT is -
0.088 (0.138) using the traditional definition of scheduled grants and -0.172 (0.016)
using the restricted definition of scheduled grants. After SOX these coefficients (p-value
from F-test) are 0.080 (0.163) and -0.016 (0.822). This evidence provides support of
H3a, but only prior to SOX.
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Table 10: Optimistic Tone and Stock Option Transactions:
SOX and Litigation Risk
Panel A:
LOW LITIGATION Pre-SOX Pre-SOX Post-SOX Post-SOX
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predict OPTIMISM OPTIMISM OPTIMISM OPTIMISM
PR PR PR PR
GRANT -0.022 0.025
(SCHED-T) (0.458) (0.242)
GRANT -0.057 -0.0 I I
(SCHED-R) (0.114) (0.768)
EXERCISE + 0.098 0.097 0.027* 0.026*
(0.162) (0. I68) (0.058) (0.074)
FUT ROA I.J I 8 1.130 0.963** 0.966**
(0.138) (0.133) (0.025) (0.025)
LAG 0.639*** 0.639*** 0.707*** 0.708***
--
OPTIMSIM
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOGWC 0.048** 0.049** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000)
PCT JMOB 0.054* 0.055* 0.054*** 0.055***
(0.056) (0.052) (0.00 I) (0.00 I)
SD ROA 2.197*** 2.192*** -0.523 -0.528
(0.006) (0.006) (0.261 ) (0.257)
ROA 0.540 0.546 -0.528 -0.528
(0.474) (0.468) (0.229) (0.229)
LOSS -0.054 -0.054 -0.084*** -0.084***
(0.1 17) (0.116) (0.000) (0.000)
BEAT 0.049** 0.049** 0.027* 0.027**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.050) (0.049)
SURP 0.452*** 0.454*** 0.184*** 0.183***
(0.00 I) (0.00 I) (0.005) (0.006)
SI DUM -0.018 -0.017 -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.561) (0.563) (0.004) (0.003)
ABS ACCR -0.446** -0.451** -0.073 -0.070
(0.048) (0.045) (0.606) (0.620)
LOGREV 0.004 0.004 0.011** 0.011**
(0.640) (0.593) (0.025) (0.021 )
DA 0.025 0.023 -0.005 -0.005
(0.692) (0.713) (0.906) (0.907)
MB 0.008** 0.008** 0.004 0.005
(0.038) (0.037) (0.116) (0. 114)
QTRlYRlIND Included Included Included Included
CONSTANT -0.403* -0.404* -0.379*** -0.378***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000)
OBS 3,417 3,417 8,674 8,674
ADJ R2 0.531 0.531 0.597 0.597
Robust p-values in parentheses, based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at
10%, 5% and I% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
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Table 10 (continued)
Panel B:
HIGH LlTlGA TlON Pre-SOX Pre-SOX Post-SOX Post-SOX
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predict OPTIMISM OPTIMISM OPTIMISM OPTIMISM
PR PR PR PR
GRANT 0.011 0.003
(SCHED-T) (0.803) (0.915)
GRANT 0.026 -0.010
(SCHED-R) (0.668) (0.866)
EXERCISE + -0.021 -0.02] -0.048** -0.048**
(0.728) (0.73]) (0.021) (0.0] 9)
FUT ROA 0.624 0.6]5 0.866** 0.865**
(0.277) (0.284) (0.042) (0.042)
LAG 0.657*** 0.657*** 0.696*** 0.696***
-
OPTIMSIM
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOGWC 0.079** 0.079** -0.005 -0.005
(0.029) (0.029) (0.802) (0.807)
PCT JMOB 0.016 0.0]5 0.0]0 0.0]0
(0.73]) (0.736) (0.663) (0.661)
SO ROA 0.023 0.028 -1.324*** -1.324***
(0.977) (0.972) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.675 0.683 0.963** 0.960**
(0.338) (0.331 ) (0.047) (0.047)
LOSS -0.06] -0.06] 0.0]4 0.0]4
(0.203) (0.205) (0.6] 5) (0.620)
BEAT 0.063* 0.063* 0.051 ** 0.05] **
(0.092) (0.09]) (0.019) (0.0]9)
SURP 0.299 0.299 0.239 0.238
(0.2] 2) (0.2] 2) (0.153) (0.]53)
SI DUM -0.002 -0.002 -0.026* -0.026*
(0.953) (0.962) (0.096) (0.096)
ABS ACCR -0.] 55 -0.153 0.1 ]2 0.] ]2
(0.564) (0.568) (0.502) (0.500)
LOG REV 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007
(0.691 ) (0.693) (0.264) (0.260)
DA 0.103 0.]03 0.23] *** 0.23]***
(0.229) (0.228) (0.000) (0.000)
MB -0.005* -0.005* -0.003 -0.003
(0.084) (0.083) (0.360) (0.359)
QTRIYRIIND Included Included Included Included
CONSTANT -0.178 -0.172 -0.173 0.164
(0.502) (0.515) (0.513) (0.351)
OBS ] ,554 1,554 ],554 3,566
ADJ R2 0.547 0.548 0.548 0.564
Robust p-values in parentheses, based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *, **. ** * indicate significance at
10%, 5% and 1% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
Optimistic Tone and Stock Option Transactions:
SOX and Discretionary Accruals
Table 11:
Discretionary accruals
Predict
GRANT
(LOW_DACC)T
GRANT
(SCHED_T)
Pre-SOX Pre-SOX Post-SOX
(I) (2) (3)
OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR
-0.085 0.071
(0. I90) (0.235)
-0.003 0.009
(0.899) (0.627)
Post-SOX
(4)
OPTIMISM PR
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GRANT
(LOW_DACC)R
GRANT
(SCHED])
EXER
(HIGH_DACC)
EXERCISE
LOW DACC
HIGH DACC
FUT ROA
CONTROLS
QTRJYRJIND
CONSTANT
OBSERVATIONS
ADJUSTED R2
F-TESTS
Sum of coefficients
-0.] 53* -0.003
(0.052) (0.973)
-0.0]9 -0.0]3
(0.580) (0.690)
-0.224** -0.224* -0.009 -0.008
(0.050) (0.050) (0.793) (0.8]4)
0.079 0.078 0.003 0.001
(0.]02) (0.] 05) (0.826) (0.905)
0.D25 0.025 0.006 0.009
(0.2]2) (0.2]] ) (0.633) (0.463)
-0.004 -0.004 -0.023* -0.023*
(0.857) (0.844) (0.068) (0.063)
0.906** 0.919** 0.926*** 0.930***
(0.040) (0.037) (0.002) (0.002)
Included Included Included Included
Included Included Included Included
-0.308* -0.309* -0.286*** -0.283***
(0.094) (0.092) (0.002) (0.002)
4.971 4.97] ]2.240 12.240
0.535 0.536 0.591 0.591
GRANT -0.088 -0.172 0.080 -0.016
(0.]38) (0.0] 6)* (0.163) (0.822)
EXERCISE + 0.]45 0.146 -.006 -.007
(0.165) (0.163) (0.847) (0.838)
Robust p-values in parentheses. based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **. *** indicate significance
at ]0%,5% and] % levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B. Additional
control variables are included in the estimation but omitted from the table for the sake of brevity.
The results for exercises do not support H3b before or after SOX. Prior to SOX,
the coefficient (p-value) of EXERCISE(HIGH DACC) is -0.224 (0.050) and the
coefficient (p-value) on EXERICSE is 0.079 (0.102). The sum of the coefficients (p-
value from F-test) on EXERCISE(HIGH DACC) and EXERICSE is -0.145 (0.165).
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After SOX, neither of the individual coefficients nor the sum of the exercise coefficients
is significant.
I interpret the results to this point as follows. Evidence from Table 5 and Table 9
does not support Hla or HI b. I do not find support for the hypotheses that managers, on
average, alter optimistic tone prior to option grants and exercises. Once I partition the
firms based on shareholder litigation risk, I find managers of low litigation risk firms
increase optimistic tone prior to option exercises while managers of high litigation risk
firm decrease optimistic tone prior to option exercises. This evidence supports H2 and
provides an explanation for the lack of support of H1b. Specifically, the negative
coefficient on EXERCISE for low litigation risk firms and positive coefficient on
EXERCISE for high litigation risk firms sum to an insignificant coefficient on average.
The results in Table 10 suggest these findings are concentrated in the post-SOX
time period. One interpretation of this evidence is that SOX increased litigation risk,
especially for firms already facing high litigation risk. Thus prior to option exercises,
managers of low litigation risk firms increased optimistic tone opportunistically, while
managers of high litigation risk firms decreased optimistic tone excessively.
The results in Table 7 and Table 11 do not support H3b. However, I find some
support of H3 a, and the support is strongest prior to Sarbanes-Oxley. Executives who
managed earnings downward prior to option grants also use less optimistic tone in the
earnings press release in the pre-SOX time period. Baker et al. (2008) and McAnally et
al. (2008) examine downward earnings management prior to option grants, but do not
distinguish between the before-SOX and after-SOX time periods. In my sample there
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are 79 scheduled grants after downward earnings management after SOX (0.65% of
observations) and 63 scheduled grants after downward earnings management before
SOX (1.27% of observations). It is possible that the complementary relation between
downward earnings management and reduced optimistic tone disappears after SOX
because managers do not reduce reported earnings prior to grants as frequently.
These results suggest that SOX had a different impact on different types of firms.
Mangers facing lower litigation risk increased optimistic tone to increase the payoff
from their option exercises, perhaps because altering tone became a less costly way to
increase option compensation. In contrast, firms that managed earnings downward and
were overly pessimistic prior to SOX reverted to more credible use of optimistic tone.
Sensitivity Tests
I investigate two alternate and potentially more powerful settings in which to test
Hla and HI b. First, I examine differences in the magnitude of option grants and
exercises. Managers are more likely to alter tone when the financial benefits of doing so
are greatest. For a given change in stock price, managers' financial gain increases with
the number of options granted or exercised. Therefore, managers are more likely to
attempt to influence stock price through changes in optimistic tone when the option
grants or option exercises are large.
Intuitively "large" is relative to the manager's wealth, i.e., a manager will have
higher incentives to alter tone if a grant or exercise represents a larger portion of their
wealth. Because I do not have data on CEOs' total wealth, I compute the size of a grant
or exercise as the dollar value of a grant or exercise scaled by the dollar value of the
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CEO's wealth in the firm. A manager's wealth in the firm is measured as the sum of
stock ownership, restricted stock, exercisable options, un-exercisable options, and total
current year compensation (option grants, salary and bonus for the fiscal year ending on
or before quarter (t». I define an observation in the upper quartile of scaled grants
(scaled exercises) as a BIG GRANT (BIG EXERCISE).
~ -
These definitions capture a potentially more powerful setting because the payoff
to changing tone is greater. However, these definitions reduce the number of GRANT
and EXERCISE observations, which reduce the power of my tests. Ire-estimate
equation (1) substituting BIG GRANT and BIG EXERCISE in place of GRANT and
- -
EXERCISE. Hla and HI b predict the coefficient on BIG_GRANT is negative and the
coefficient on BIG_EXERCISE is positive.
Table 12, Panel A presents the results of this estimation. I find the coefficient (p-
value) on BIG GRANT is 0.029 (0.383) for the traditional definition of scheduled grants
and -0.029 (0.596) for the restrictive definition of scheduled grant. This evidence does
not support the prediction in HI a that managers reduce optimistic tone prior to option
grants, even when the potential financial rewards are greatest. In the two specifications
the coefficients (p-value) on BIG_EXERCISE are -0.014 (0.535) and -0.014 (0.530),
respectively. This evidence does not support the prediction in HI b that managers
increase optimistic tone prior to option exercises, even when the potential financial
rewards are greatest. Instead, the evidence suggests that large grants and exercises do
not induce managers to alter their use of optimistic tone.
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Next I investigate the timing of option grants and exercises. Initially, I limit my
sample to grants or exercises that occur between the press release for quarter (t) and the
end of quarter (H1). However, if managers are using optimistic tone to influence stock
prices they are most likely to benefit when option transactions occur soon after the press
release. The price reaction to opportunistic or inaccurate narrative tone will reverse
when true firm performance is revealed. Thus the longer the time until an option
transaction, the more likely it is that any temporary mis-pricing (due to narrative tone)
will disappear before the manager is granted or exercises options. As a result, I expect
that when grant and exercise transactions occur soon after (within 30 days of) the press
release, managers are more likely to have altered tone, and thus I am more likely to find
the relations predicted by HI a and HI b.
The results for option grants and exercises that occur within 30 days of the
earnings press release are presented in Table 12, Panel B. Hla and Hlb predict a
negative coefficient on GRANT and a positive coefficient on EXERCISE. However, I
find the coefficients (p-values) on the traditional and restrictive definitions of GRANT
are 0.003 (0.895) and -0.036 (0.261). This evidence is consistent with the main findings
and does not support the prediction in HI a that managers reduce optimistic tone prior to
option grants. In both specifications the coefficient on EXERCISE is -0.003 (with p-
values of 0.853 and 0.833). This evidence is consistent with the main findings and does
not support the prediction in HI b that managers increase optimistic tone prior to option
exercises. Thus it appears grants and exercises that occur soon after the press release do
not induce managers to alter optimistic tone.
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Table 12: Optimistic Tone and Stock Option Transactions: Sensitivity Tests
Panel A: Large grants and exercises
(I) (2)
Prediction OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR
BIG GRANT 0.029
(SCHED-T) (0.383)
BIG GRANT -0.029
(SCHED-R) (0.596)
BIG EXERCISE + -0.014 -0.014
(0.535) (0.530)
FUT ROA 0.962*** 0.965***
(0.000) (0.000)
LAG OPTIMSIM 0.699*** 0.699***
(0.000) (0.000)
LOGWC 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000)
PCT JMOB 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.002)
SD ROA -0.321 -0.3 14
(0.223) (0.233)
ROA 0.242 0.232
(0.376) (0.395)
LOSS -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.001) (0.001)
BEAT 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000)
SURP 0.240*** 0.238***
(0.000) (0.000)
SI DUM -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.004)
ABS ACCR -0.151 * -0.150
(0.097) (0.101)
LOGREV 0.006* 0.006*
(0.091 ) (0.085)
DA 0.089*** 0.089***
(0.000) (0.000)
MB 0.001 0.001
(0.539) (0.544)
QTRJYRJIND Included Included
CONSTANT -0.196** -0.194**
(0.019) (0.020)
OBSERVATIONS 17,211 17,211
ADJUSTED R2 0.577 0.577
Robust p-values in parentheses, based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at
10%.5% and 1% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
Table 12 (continued)
Panel B: Grants and exercises within 30 days ofthe earnings press release
(J) (2)
Prediction OPTIMISM PR OPTIMISM PR
GRANT (SCHED-T) 0.003
(0.895)
GRANT (SCHED-R) -0.036
(0.261)
EXERCISE + -0.003 -0.003
(0.853) (0.833)
FUT ROA 0.960*** 0.965***
(0.000) (0.000)
LAG OPTIMSIM 0.699*** 0.699***
(0.000) (0.000)
LOGWC 0.038*** 0.039***
(0.000) (0.000)
PCT JMOB 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.002)
SD ROA -0.317 -0.321
(0.229) (0.223)
ROA 0.235 0.229
(0.389) (00400)
LOSS -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.001) (0.000)
BEAT 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000)
SURP 0.239*** 0.239***
(0.000) (0.000)
SI DUM -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.004)
ABS ACCR -0.150* -0.150*
(0.099) (0.099)
LOGREV 0.006* 0.006*
(0.086) (0.083)
DA 0.089*** 0.090***
(0.000) (0.000)
MB 0.001 0.001
(0.549) (0.546)
QTRIYR/IND Included Included
CONSTANT -0.195** -0.196**
(0.019) (0.019)
OBSERVATIONS 17,211 17,211
ADJUSTED R2 0.577 0.577
Robust p-values in parentheses. based on Huber-White adjusted standard errors. *. **. *** indicate significance
at 10%. 5% and 1% levels based on two-tailed tests. For complete definitions see Appendix B.
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CHAPTER VI
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
I conduct a series of robustness tests to ensure my results are not driven by
variable measurement or research design choices. Specifically, I investigate
unscheduled option grants, altering the control group, differences across fiscal quarters,
the importance of CEO tenure, and an alternate method of computing unexpected
optimistic tone for the market reaction tests.
In the first robustness test I repeat my analysis using unscheduled grants (as
opposed to scheduled grants) and using all grants (scheduled and unscheduled). As
previously noted, I use scheduled grants in my main tests because managers are more
likely to know of scheduled grants in advance, and therefore adjust disclosure tone prior
to these grants. Using either unscheduled grants or all grants, the results for the tests of
Hla and HI b are similar to those presented in Table 5. I do not find evidence to support
these hypotheses. Similarly, I do not find support for H2 using either unscheduled
grants or all grants. These results are in contrast to the evidence in support ofH2
presented in Table 6 and Table 9. Finally, these definitions of grants do not lend support
to H3a and H3b. The results of these tests are consistent with arguments made in prior
literature that managers are more likely to have prior knowledge of scheduled grants.
The second robustness test involves altering the control group. In the primary
specification there are firms in the control group for which the CEO neither receives an
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option grant nor exercises options for the entire sample period. If these firms use
language in a systematically different manner than firms for which the CEO either
receives or exercises options then these "non-option" firms do not belong in the control
group. Therefore I limit the control group to the firm-quarters in which the CEO did not
receive or exercise options, but only include firms for which the CEO received or
exercised options at some point during the sample period. I repeat my tests using this
limited control group. The results, which I do not tabulate, are qualitatively similar to
those reported in Table 5 through Table 7.20
The third robustness check investigates potential differences across firm-quarters.
The distribution of grants and exercises is not uniform across fiscal quarters.
Approximately 43% of scheduled grants occur after the fourth quarter press release (i.e.,
the grant award is made in the first quarter) while only about 10% occur after the second
quarter press release. For exercises, 31 % occur after the third quarter press release (i.e.,
during the fourth quarter) while only 19% occur after the fourth quarter press release.
When I repeat my primary tests by fiscal quarter, the results (un-tabulated) are
qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 5. I do not find support for HI a or HI b
in any individual quarter.
In the fourth robustness test I investigate if my results are sensitive to a particular
attribute of the CEO, their tenure. It is possible that CEOs' concerns about their
credibility and market reputation decrease as they approach the end of their career, and
thus are more likely to be opportunistic in their narrative disclosure. I partition the
20 These results are unsurprising given this sample includes approximately 89% of the total number of
observations.
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sample into above and below median tenure, and then into the upper quartile and lower
three quartiles of tenure. The results for all sub-samples are qualitatively consistent with
the results presents in Table 5. I do not find support for Hla or HI b for CEOs with
longer tenure.
In the fifth robustness test I assess the importance of the size of option
transactions using a firm fixed-effects model. I use the dollar value of the grant or
exercise in place of GRANT and r..-XERCISE. This research design has the advantage of
capturing unobservable firm-specific characteristics that might influence the use of
optimistic tone. The results, which are not tabulated, are similar to those presented in
Table 5.
Finally, to further ensure the results in my returns regressions are not driven by a
potentially mis-specified expectations model, I examine a different measure of
unexpected optimistic tone, UNEXP_OPT2. UNEXP_OPT2 is a simple first difference
of optimistic tone (OPTIMISM_PRIess LAG_ OPTIAfISMY R) as opposed to the
residual from a regression model. The results of the short-window returns regression are
quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 11, and inferences
remain unchanged.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I investigate whether managers alter the language used in the
narrative portion of their earnings press releases, i.e., the linguistic tone, to increase their
payoff from stock options. An alternative explanation for the variation in the optimistic
tone of earnings press releases is that managers use the flexibility in narrative disclosure
to communicate expectations for future firm performance.
Using a sample of 17,211 firm-quarters from 1998-2006, I test several
hypotheses regarding managers' language choices. I find limited support for my
hypotheses. Specifically, I find that earnings press releases are less optimistic prior to
option grants when firms also have low discretionary accruals. This suggests altering
tone and downward earnings management are complementary strategies to lower stock
price prior to option grants. In addition, I find evidence of increased optimistic tone in
press releases prior to option exercises, except in industries where litigation risk is high.
This suggests that shareholder litigation plays a role in reducing managerial
opportunism. Finally, consistent with prior literature I find, on average, a positive
relation between optimistic tone in the earnings announcement and future return on
assets. However, I find this relation does not hold when the earnings announcement
precedes an option transaction.
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My study makes contributions to several streams of literature. I contribute to the
voluntary disclosure literature by examining whether managers use a specific strategy in
their narrative disclosures to increase their personal wealth. Next, while prior literature
investigates compensation increases resulting from adjusting discretionary accruals
(earnings management), I provide evidence managers alter the tone of earnings
announcements, and that altering tone complements earnings management around option
grants. More generally, I provide evidence how managers trade-off opportunism and
credibility within disclosures. My study suggests that when managers select between
opportunistically increasing stock option compensation or maintaining their reputation in
capital and labor markets, they make some efforts to be opportunistic unless they are
constrained by other forces (i.e., fear of litigation). This is of interest market participants
and regulators who are concerned about the credibility of disclosures, particularly when
managerial incentives encourage opportunism.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF WORDS USED TO COMPUTE THE OPTIMISM SCORE
OPTIMISIM PR is computed as the percentage of words in the earnings press release
included in the optimistic word categories less the percentage of words in the earnings
press release included in the pessimistic word categories as defined by DICTION 5.0. a
Below are examples of words from each category.
OPTIMISTIC WORDS
PRAISE CATEGORY contains adjectives which affirm a person, group or entity.
Sample words: deIigh(ful, witty, mighty, handsome, beaut(ful, successful, reasonable,
bright, vigilant, good, noble.
SATISFACTION CATEGORY contains words associated with a positive affective
state, joy, triumph, and nurturing.
Sample words: passionate, cheerful, welcome, thanks, excited, fim, lucky, celebrafjng,
auspicious, encourage, secure, pride.
INSPIRATION CATEGORY contains terms related to abstract virtues.
Sample words: faith, honesty, virtue, courage, dedication, success, educafjon, justice,
patriotism, wisdom.
PESSIMISTIC WORDS
BLAME CATEGORY contains words designating social inappropriateness, evil,
unfortunate circumstances, unplanned changes of fortune, or denigrations.
Sample words: mean, naive, sloppy, repugnant, malicious, bankrupt, rash, morbid.
embarrassing, weary, painfitl, detrimental, illegitimate, offensive, miserly.
HARDSHIP CATEGORY contains words indicating natural disasters, hostile actions,
censurable behavior, unsavory political outcomes, human fears and incapacities.
Sample words: earthquake, pollution, tornado, enemies, vices, infidelity, betrayal,
injustice, slavery, exploitation, grief, unemployment, apprehension, error, weakness.
DENIAL CATEGORY contains standard negative contractions, negative words, and
terms for null sets.
Sample words: aren't, shouldn't, don't, nor, not, nay, nothing. nobody, none.
a Word list descriptions are from DICTION 5.0 documentation (Hart 2000a).
OPTIMISM PR
UNEXP OPT
GRANT (SCHED-T)
GRANT (SCHED-R)
GRANT (ALL)
EXERCISE
FUT ROA
LOGWC
PCT JMOB
SO ROA
ROA
LOSS
BEAT
SURP
SI DUM
ABS ACCR
LOGREV
DA
MB
CAR PR
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APPENDIXB
COMPLETE VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Optimism score based on DICTION 5.0: the percentage of
optimistic words less percentage of pessimistic words.
Unexpected optimistic tone: the residual from the optimistic tone
determinants regression equation (2).
Indicator variable equal to I ifthe CEO received a scheduled
grant, defined (traditional definition) as when there was also a
grant on the same month/day (plus or minus 7 days) in the prior
calendar year.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO received a scheduled
grant, defined (restrictive definition) as when there was also a
grant on the same month/day (plus or minus 7 days) in the prior
calendar year and the following calendar year.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO received an option grant
after the press release and the end of the fiscal qUaIier.
Indicator variable equal to I if the CEO exercised options between
the press release and the end of the fiscal qUaIier.
Mean ofROA for quarters (t+ I) through (t+4).
The natural log of the number of words in the press release.
The percentage oftimes in the prior 4 qualiers the firm met the
median analyst forecast or beat the median forecast by less than
three cents (O=«actual-medest)< .03).
Standard deviation of ROA for quarters (t-l) through (t-4).
Income before extraordinary items/beginning assets (IBQ/ATQ).
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm made a loss.
Indicator variable equal to 1 ifthe firm beat or met the consensus
analyst forecast (actual earnings less median forecast in I/B/E/S).
Actual earnings - last median forecast for the qUaIier from
I/B/E/S scaled by beginning of period stock price (I/B/E/S actual
- I/B/E/S medest)/Compustat PRCCQt.l.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm records a special item
(litigation cost, goodwill impairment, restructuring, writedown, or
other special item: GDWILIPQ, SETPQ, RCPQ, WDPQ,SPIOQ).
The absolute value of accruals measured as income before
extraordinary items - cash flow from operation scaled by average
assets ((IBQ-OANCFY)/(( ATQ+ATQ'.1)/2)).
Log of sales (SALEQ).
Debt to assets: liabilities/ending assets (LTQ/ATQ).
Market to book value of common stock ((CEQQ*PRCCQ)/
CSHOQ) both measured at quarter end.
Three day size and book to market adjusted returns centered on
the date ofthe earnings press release.
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